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Abstract
This paper presents a “hybrid” Diamond model with altruistic households
and studies the effects of public debt on wealth inequality. The results, as
in some models based on incomplete financial markets, show that more gov-
ernment borrowing will suppress wealth inequality. This suggests that the
heterogeneity in endowments might be the main driving force for that partic-
ular relationship. In terms of policy, it is likely then that debt adjustments
might clash with demands to reduce wealth inequality.
Keywords: Public debt, wealth inequality, altruism, “Joy-of-giving”
bequests, Diamond Model
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1. Introduction
Public debt, conditioned in its prudent use, is among the policy instru-
ments that can improve the social welfare. More recently, concerns over
sustainability have provoked fiscal consolidation plans with unknown dis-
tributive outcomes. In addition, public debt is an asset people frequently
invest in, and its manipulation by authorities can have a direct impact on
the distribution of wealth. Hence, understanding the relationship between
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government debt and wealth inequality seems important. One main reason,
as this paper will demonstrate, is that government debt might behave as a
redistributive device, not only across generations (as the traditional percep-
tion is) but also within. In addition, the present analysis offers a theoretical
benchmark case to address counter-factual questions such as: will the level
of wealth inequality be lower (higher) if US spends less (more) on wars ? Or
more generally, will the level of wealth inequality increase (decrease) with
more “unproductive” government spending ? How debt adjustments might
relate with wealth inequality ?
To answer those questions, I developed a “hybrid” version of Diamond
(1965) model with altruistically linked families which differ in their endow-
ments. However, parents instead of caring about the welfare of their off-
spring, enjoy utility directly from bequests. The novelty of this approach
allows three distinct features to be combined. First, it compromises between
the savings motive of a Ramsey and Diamond economy. Second, it maintains
a minimum role for Government debt within a simple framework. And third,
it permits a measure of wealth inequality which is analytically tractable.
In this paper, public debt has the interpretation of a differed tax. There-
fore, I used three different tax instruments to approximate specific tax regimes.
More specifically, I consider separately a “Regressive”, a “Progressive” and
an “Affine” tax instrument on labour. The different cases are meant to com-
pare countries (or adjustments) that are identical, except for the choice of
the tax instrument. Focusing on the stationary state, surprisingly enough,
the qualitative results at the macroeconomic level are equivalent, although
they have different microeconomic mechanics.
At the macroeconomic level, a positive debt shock will crowd out capital
and when the latter is sufficiently strong, average wealth will fall. Using
as a measure of inequality the coefficient of variation, the fall in average
wealth tends to amplify the initial disparity. In parallel, a permanent increase
in public debt will also raise the tax burden and affect the interest rate.
Savings responses then will determine the asset position among individuals
and thus the change in variance. In the calibrated version of the model,
this change is negative and inequality tends to decrease. In equilibrium, the
drop in variance dominates the fall in the mean and therefore inequality is
suppressed.
At the microeconomic level, as soon as debt is conceived as differed tax-
ation, different tax instruments coupled with the bequest transfer, consti-
tute a composite transfers scheme with diverse income and substitution ef-
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fects (Polemarchakis (1983); Galor and Polemarchakis (1987)). Nonetheless,
when the life-cycle considerations for savings (that is, the “egoistic” motive
to finance future consumption, and the “altruistic” one to leave a positive
bequest) are taken into account, the altruistic motive will play a critical role
into agents savings behaviour. A consequence of heterogeneity is that “rich”
and “poor” households will never have the same qualitative response over
their own saving scopes. As a result, any change in debt policy will trigger
asymmetric effects on asset holdings. In this context, the choice of the tax
instrument is of relevance, solely to determine the nature of the change in
the variance.
For instance, when the tax instrument is of “regressive” type, the drop in
inequality is driven by the increase in savings of the “poor”. The intuition
for the behaviour of the “poor” is as follows; The “poorest” individuals (who
had already low wages prior to the shock) would see their real wage to further
decline and their tax liability (regressive in nature) to increase. Unless they
start saving more, by exploiting the rise in the rate of interest, they will not be
in a position to finance their future consumption net of bequests. This could
never happen with the relatively “rich”, since the (extended to altruism)
income effect always dominates. In contrast, when the tax type is more
“progressive”, individuals will only differ in their quantitative responses. The
drop in inequality in this case, is driven by the different in magnitude dis-
savings across individuals.
While this paper focuses primarily on the effects of debt on wealth in-
equality, its contribution can be extended onto another aspects. On a the-
oretical level, I show how the model replicates the steady state results of
Diamond (1965), by utilizing the properties of the savings and bequests
functions. Therefore, Diamond’s original contribution (and in contrast to
the general belief) is robust to a bequest motive, as soon as this is of the
type mentioned earlier. This finding, to the best of my knowledge, was
undiscovered in the literature. In an extension of Diamond’s results, the
findings of this paper suggest that when economies are dynamic inefficient,
the “equity-efficiency” trade-off breaks down1.
The paper is also related to the causal effects of debt on growth. As
Bhandari et al. (2013) claim, this relationship cannot be empirically assessed
1See Rhee (1991) and King and Ferguson (1993) for a broader view on dynamic ineffi-
ciency.
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unless,inter alia, the distributive costs of debt (within the population) are
taken into account. Moreover, research shows wealth inequality may have
adverse economic outcomes, either as a destabilizing factor (Ghiglino and
Venditti (2011)) or as a variable affecting the risk premium (Gollier (2001)).
For this reason, studying alternative explanations for the levels of wealth
inequality is equally prominent.
The literature of public debt and economic inequalities, focused on the
discussion mainly across generation (as in Romer (1988); Altig and Davis
(1989)); whereas this paper examines the within cohort effects2. Notable
exceptions include Floden (2001) and Rhrs and Winter (2013). Both papers
are quantitatively orientated and rely on incomplete markets models (in the
tradition of Aiyagari (1994)) to analyse the welfare properties of public debt.
The first pins down specific combinations of optimal transfers and debt
levels and examines, among other things, the change in wealth inequality
when at a particular combination. As this paper, Floden (2001) also empha-
sizes the negative relationship between public debt and wealth inequality.
This might suggests that the heterogeneity in endowments rather than the
incompleteness of financial markets could be the main driver for that par-
ticular relationship. With regard to the latter, its primary concern is to
weight the relative (welfare) merits of debt adjustments at cases where the
distribution of wealth is highly unequal3.
In another study, although again different in scope, Heathcote (2005) ex-
amines the effects of fiscal policy (tax shocks) when agents face uninsurable
idiosyncratic risk and compares his results against the first best4. Finally,
Azzimonti et al. (2012) address the role of financial liberation to rationalize
the joint evolution in the rise of public debt and income inequality observed
in the data. However, their specific approach to endogenize public debt is
hard to reconcile with episodes of debt adjustments5. Nonetheless, a com-
mon feature for the literature discussed so far, is the reliance on Ramsey
2On the interaction of public debt with bequests, prominent examples are Barro (1974),
Laitner (1979), Drazen (1978) or Burbidge (1983)
3Nevertheless, the negative relationship between debt and wealth inequality is also
implicit in their analysis.
4Within the general topic of Fiscal Policy, see also Garcia and Turnovsky (2007) or
Alonso-Carrera et al. (2012) for the effects on income inequality.
5In their paper, public debt is endogenized through probabilistic voting within a frame-
work of incomplete markets.
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economies. In such environment, altruism is only implicit and it is assumed
that any shock cannot affect consumers altruistic attitude. However, as I
explain in this paper, this might be a seriously flawed approach.
The organization of the paper is as follows; In Section 2 the details of
the model are set-up. In Section 3, the measure of wealth inequality is
constructed and discussed. Section 4 focuses on the macroeconomic environ-
ment. Section 5 analyses the effects on wealth inequality, while Section 6
presents the main results.
2. The Model
The main environment modifies that of Diamond (1965) into two main di-
mensions. First, I introduce heterogeneity in labour or “ability” endowments
and second I allow individuals to have a “joy-of-giving” bequest motive. Two
factors motivate the particular choice for the bequest motive. The one fac-
tor is to allow some minimal role for debt (See Online Appendix) and the
other one to gain analytical simplicity. Although Altonji et al. (1997) claim
that the particular bequest motive might be more relevant in practice6. The
present procedure also compromises, in a simple and tractable way, the two
extremes between a Ramsey and a Diamond economy. In the first kind of
economy, any life-cycle considerations are nullified while the latter abstracts
from bequests. Finally, the method to assess wealth inequality borrows from
Bossmann et al. (2007) with some variations.
On the demand side, consumer i, of generation t who lives in period
t maximizes lifetime utility by choosing consumption ctit when young, con-
sumption ctit+1 when old and bequests xit+1 to transfer to his “son”. In the
notation, the superscript is the generation index and the subscript denotes
calendar time. Total savings atit+1 of the young, determined in period t, are
allocated between government bonds and capital. Bonds to be purchased
have to pay the same interest rate as capital, making the portfolio compo-
sition indetermined. Moreover, agents differ in labour endowments li, which
supply inelastically. This is the first source of heterogeneity in this model and
it is assumed to be exogenous. The second one, implicit in this model, is the
6There is a consensus among the profession, over the presence of a bequest motive.
For a survey see Laitner and Ohlsson (2001) or Light and McGarry (2003). For the
“joy-of-giving” bequest motive as a reduced form specification of altruism see Abel and
Warshawsky (1987).
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bequest each “young” is endowed with7. If preferences are time separable,
the individual maximization problem reads:
max
ctit,c
t
it+1,xit+1
V it = U(c
t
it)+βU(c
t
it+1) + δU(xit+1) (1)
s.t
ctit + a
t
it+1 = D
i
t (2)
ctit+1 + (1 + n)xit+1 = (1 + rt+1)a
t
it+1 (3)
ctit > 0, c
t
it+1 > 0, xit+1 > 0
The utility function is standard homothetic with the usual neoclassical
assumptions. Equations (2) and (3) are the budgets constraint in the two
periods of life. In the notation, Dit is the disposable income of the young and
n is the population growth. The components of disposable income include
the after tax wage and the transfer received by the “parent”. The degree of
altruism, δ is assumed to be lower than the discount factor β, with 0 < δ <
β < 1. Thus, the “parent” values his own consumption greater. The first
order conditions, assuming bequests are operative, are8:
(1 + n)βU ′(ctit+1) = δU
′(xit+1) (4)
U ′(ctit) = β(1 + rt+1)U
′(ctit+1) (5)
For simplicity, I also assume the distribution of labour endowments to
be constant over time with the mean normalized to 1 and some variance σ2.
Someone could justify this assumption based on recent research by Huggett
et al. (2011). Their findings suggest that for life-time inequality in wealth
and welfare, ex-ante heterogeneity is far more important than differences in
luck (that is, ex-post heterogeneity). Alternatively, the assumption on the
distribution of labour endowments, can also be thought as equivalent to an
environment of a fixed intergenerational mobility, which it seems to be con-
sistent with the US data (See Chetty et al. (2014)). Finally to characterize
7It is also assumed the “initial old” differ in their assets. The maximization problem
then will only involve the consumption and bequests choices.
8The Inada assumptions for preference ensure that bequest will always be operative
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the optimum plans, the assumptions on the distribution of “skills” and ho-
mothetic preferences, admit solutions in “Gorman Form” (that is,“linear in
wealth”). Accordingly, the optimum plans for savings and bequests are:
atit+1 = SDD
i
t = SD
[
I it + x
i
t
] ≡ St(Dit, rt+1) (6)
xit+1 = XSa
t
it+1 ≡ X(rt+1, atit+1) (7)
As usual, rt+1 is the rate of interest in period t+1, I
i
t is the after tax wage,
while S(Dit, rt+1) and X(rt+1, a
t
it+1) are the optimal savings and bequests
functions respectively. In their “Gorman form” counterparts shown in (6)
and (7), SD denotes the marginal propensity to save (MPS) out of disposable
income, while Xs > 0 is the marginal propensity to bequeath out of savings
(MPB). In Section 4, I will use the inequalities 0 < SD, XS < 1, where XS ≡
(1+n)Xs
(1+rt+1)
describes the modified or the dynamic efficiency adjusted MPB9.
On the supply side, markets are competitive and capital depreciates fully
within a period. I also assume that a exists a representative firm, which uses
capital and labour to produce output. The production function is standard
neoclassical with common assumptions. From profits maximization, factor
prices in their intensive form equal to:
wt = f(kt)− f ′(kt)kt (8)
1 + rt = f
′(kt) > 0 with f(kt)′′ < 0 (9)
Moreover it is assumed that exist a government which in period t issues
bonds, Bt+1, and collects taxes Tt. The government uses its revenues to
repay interest on the previously issued bonds, Bt. Thus, debt substitutes
taxes to finance some given path of (unproductive) government expenses.
In the text, I will analyse three different cases in terms of the available tax
instrument; A flat (or “Regressive”), a proportional (or “Progressive”) and
an affine tax instrument. Concerning the latter as Bhandari et al. (2013)
9To ease the notation, I omit to make explicit the dependence of MPS and MPB on
interest rates and hence on the time period. For the properties of the savings and bequest
functions see On-line Appendix.
7
argue, it approximates better the tax system in the US. In that case, the
analysis on “Flat” or “Proportional” tax systems will become instrumental
to the “Affine tax” economy for reasons I will discuss later. Nevertheless,
flat or more progressive tax systems alone are also quite common in practice
(See Keen et al. (2012) for countries with “Flat tax” systems). Finally, it
is assumed that all taxes fall on “labour” or the “young” generation10. For
each case, total tax revenues equal:
Tt =
[
τ ft Nt or τ
p
t wt
Nt∑
i=1
li or τAt wt
Nt∑
i=1
li − TAt Nt
]
where Nt is the population size in period t, τ
F
t the lump-sum tax in “flat
tax” economy, τ pt the marginal tax rate in the “Progressive tax” system and
τAt and T
A
t are the equivalent tax instruments for the “Affine tax” regime.
In summary, government’s budget constraint in absolute terms equals:
Bt+1 + Tt = (1 + rt)Bt
Assuming constant debt per labour policy (and taking into consideration
that for large economies averages converge to their means), the per capita
cost for financing this policy in each case is:
τFt = (rt − n)b (10)
τPt =
(rt − n)b
wt
(11)
TAt = (rt − n)b− τAt wt (12)
where b ≡ Bt+1
Nt+1
= Bt
Nt
, is debt per labour. In all cases, the model assumes
that debt generates positive savings. In the event of a debt shock and the
subsequent permanent change in disposable income, I keep the terminology
in the literature and refer to it as “wealth effects” (Baxter and King (1993)).
10Alternatively, we can assume that the tax on capital is set optimally to zero, following
the traditional literature on optimal taxation (as in Chamley (1986)). In the case of
bequests, these are taxed naturally with a “biological rate” n. The latter is equivalent to
a redistributive policy from the “old” to the “young”, with neutral government revenues.
See also, Piketty and Saez (2013) for optimal bequest taxation and Bossmann et al. (2007)
for the effect on wealth inequality.
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For the affine tax economies there are two degrees of freedom: The gov-
ernment to maintain its policy can either adjust its flat tax component or
the marginal tax rate. The specification in (12) implies the first to occur. If
instead, the option was on the marginal tax rate, results would follow that
of the proportional tax system11. Due to lack of space, I will restrict the
attention to the one in the main text.
Another peculiarity that emerges in an “Affine” tax system is that indi-
viduals, for given endowments, are segregated between those who pay taxes
and those who receive subsides. To see this, note that the after tax wages in
this case are wtl
i− [(rt−n)b+ τAt wt(li−1)]. Therefore, if the economy is dy-
namic inefficient, only those with endowment li < 1 are subsidised; Whether
the rest will be paying taxes or not, depend on the degree of dynamic in-
efficiency and the marginal tax rate. On the other hand, if the economy
is dynamic efficient, as we can see from equation (12), the TA term can be
either positive or negative. This depends, in turn, on whether debt repay-
ments are “high” or not relative to the revenues collected from wages. As
previously, someone can show that some “poor” (li < 1− (rt−n)b
τAwt
) are subject
to negative taxation (that is, “welfare benefits”). Nevertheless, none of those
“discriminating” features will play any role for the qualitative pattern of the
results.
3. Individual Wealth Accumulation and Wealth Inequality
Bequests facilitate the intergenerational link for the transmission of wealth
among families. Substituting (7) in (6), wealth accumulation takes the fol-
lowing form:
atit+1 = SD[I
i
t +Xsa
t−1
it ]⇒ atit+1 = SDIit + SDXs︸ ︷︷ ︸
=C4t
at−1it (13)
For the three different tax structures, the after tax wage equals I it =[
wtli − τFt , (1− τPt )wtli, (1− τAt )wtli − TAt
]
.
Equation (13) describes the transmission process of wealth accumulation.
Its intuition is very simple: The wealth of a family (or “Dynasty”) is the sum
11See footnote 21 in Section 5 and the discussion therein.
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of the own wealth plus any financial wealth left by the predecessor in form of
transfers. In the previous period, part (1 − SD) of transfers were consumed
and the rest (SD) were saved. From that financial stock, a certain amount
was kept for consumption and the rest, XS, passed on to the offspring. Thus,
SDXS reflects the fraction from total savings attributed to altruism. This
component, along with own wealth, determines the available asset position
in the current period.
It follows that in the absence of any willingness to bequeath, initial wealth
levels persist forever, whereas some degree of altruism allows wealth to ex-
pand. Therefore, unless this degree is not too high (reflected in XS), wealth
accumulation might become explosive. In (13), a sufficient condition for
mean-reversion is C4t ≡ SDXs < 1. However, as soon as XS depends on
the interest rate, debt policies become critical for the existence of a station-
ary state in the microeconomic level. Nonetheless, as I will show in Section
4, a more stringent condition is needed for the macroeconomic or financial
stability12.
At present, is it useful to define the ratio SD
1−SDXS . The numerator (SD)
is the fraction of savings attributed to the gross life-cycle considerations;
that is, to finance future expenditures. The denominator (1− SDXS) is the
fraction of own investments allocated to personal consumption. Then, the
ratio of these two can define the net life-cycle component of savings; that
is, the part of total wealth invested to finance future consumption net of
bequests. I call this ratio as the egoistic MPS. In the subsequent analysis,
this fraction will interact with the wage rate, giving a very natural meaning
in the event of a shock. In fact, any perturbation on the SDw
1−SDXS will reflect
a “battle” between the own life-cycle and the altruistic considerations.
3.1. Stationary wealth inequality
A tractable measure of inequality frequently used in the literature and the
one also employed in Bossmann et al. (2007) is the coefficient of variation,
CV =
√
V ar(ait)
E(ait)
. In this definition, E(ait) is the mean wealth and V ar(ait)
the variance. Restricting our analysis in the stationary state (assuming C4 <
1 , E(ait+1) = E(ait) = E(ai), Var(ait+1) = Var(ait) = Var(ai) and kt+1 =
kt = k ), the first two long-run moments using (13) are respectively equal to:
12While SD might not depend on interest rates (e.g with log utility), the MPB always
does.
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E(ai) =
SD[w − (r − n)b]
1− SDXs (14)
VarP(ai) =
[
SD[w − (r − n)b]
]2
σ2
1− (SDXs)2 (15)
VarF(ai) =
(SDw)
2 σ2
1− (SDXs)2 (16)
VarA(ai) = (1− τA)2VarF(a) (17)
where in all cases above, I substituted for taxes using (10), (11) and
(12) respectively. Note that in the “Progressive” tax system and in contrast
to the rest, debt policies affect directly the dispersion of wealth (equation
(15)). Second, an “Affine” tax instrument only rescales the variance of a
flat tax economy (equation (17)). Therefore, the choice for the marginal
tax rate only parametrizes the level of inequality and it is irrelevant for the
qualitative effects13. Third, since the mean for all these economies is the same
by construction, to compare the levels of wealth inequality between them is
just sufficient to compare the variances. It turns out that if the economy
is dynamic inefficient (r < n), the “Progressive” tax system will produce
more wealth inequality. This seems intuitive, since the rich are more heavily
subsidised. Note also that the wealth dispersion in affine tax economy will
be higher relative to “Progressive” one, iff the marginal tax rate is not “too
low” relative to the interest rate14.
Finally, from (14), (17), (16) and (15) the stationary coefficient of varia-
tion for each case equals:
13If instead, the free parameter was set to be the TA, the respective measure would had
followed that of the “Progressive” tax system.
14 Comparing the variances someone has to sign the term SD(τ
Aw)−(r−n)b, if positive
this implies that the “progressive” tax system has higher inequalities than the “Affine”
one, otherwise is the opposite.
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CVP = σ
(√
SD[w − (r − n)b]
(1 + SDXs)
)
(18)
CVF = σ
(
SDw√
(1 + SDXs)
√
SD[w − (r − n)b]
)
(19)
CVA = σ(1− τ)CVA (20)
Note that the level of inequality is an implicit function of capital and debt.
Therefore, macroeconomic shocks are of first-order importance in “shifting”
the distribution of wealth (i.e. a change in inequality levels). It is necessary
to put those into context, since at the macro level, the effect on inequality is
essentially attributed to simultaneous changes in the mean and the variance.
4. The Macroeconomic environment
The equilibrium in financial markets will determine the macroeconomic
state. The particular clearing condition, requires capital and bonds to com-
pete for the average savings of the “young”. For the large economies, av-
erage savings equal the mean assets, which in turn equal the savings of the
“representative-mean” individual. Therefore, the financial markets clearing
condition in per capita terms is:
E(ait+1) ≡ (1 + n)(kt+1 + b) = St(Dt, rt+1) (21)
where S(Dt, rt+1) is the optimal mean saving function (See (6)), Dt = wt−
(r−n)b+X(rt, St−1) denotes the mean disposable income and X(rt, St−1)) is
the mean bequest function (See (7)), all in period t. For the macroeconomic
state, only the mean taxes matter (i.e. the taxes the individual with the
mean “skill” faces). As a consequence, for all of our three economies, the
aggregate behaviour is governed by the same law of motion (21). For the
specific law of motion, the stability condition is:
0 <
dkt+1
dkt
∣∣∣∣
db=0
=
SD
[
− (k + b)f ′′ +Xrf ′′ + (1 + n)Xs
]
[(1 + n)− Srf ′′] < 1 (22)
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To gain some further insights from (22), this can alternatively be written
as:
C4 ≡ SDXs < 1−

[
Sr + SD[(
1
Z+1
− 1)(k + b)
]
1 + n
 f ′′
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Π
(23)
where Xr ≡ ∂X(rt,St−1)∂rt+1 =
S(D,r)
1+n
Z+1
= (k+b)
Z+1
, and Z = δU
′′(xt+1)
(1+n)2βU ′′(ct+1)
> 0 ⇒
1
Z+1
< 1. In the “normal” case where ∂S(D,r)
∂r
≡ Sr < 0, the sign of Π is
positive for any (non-negative) debt level15. In consequence, for macroeco-
nomic or financial stability a stronger restriction on C4 = SDXS is necessary.
For example, in the special case of a logarithmic utility function Sr = 0. In
that particular case, the stability condition implies a more definite upper
bound C(b) (controlled by debt policy) such as the average intergenerational
wealth persistence which should not only be less than one but also less than
a specific threshold, i.e. C4 < C(b) < 1.
The main message of the paragraph above, deems financial stability to
be jointly determined by the amount of debt and the level of inequality.
More specifically, in the most plausible case (Sr < 0), the microeconomic
condition for stationary distribution is only necessary and not sufficient for
macroeconomic stability. Loosely put, “average private altruism” is detached
from the “average social altruism” and debt policies can affect the distance
between them, not necessarily directly but indirectly through its effect on
marginal propensity to bequeath16. In what follows, I will assume that the
15 Sr < 0 implies that any increase in the supply of assets will decrease interest rates for
some given asset demand. In conventional models with CES (CRRA) utility function Sr
is negative when the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is less than one. Nonetheless,
the case of Sr < 0 does not rule out “sunspot” behaviour (i.e. multiple steady states).
See Galor and Ryder (1989). Therefore, in the numerical exercises, I will assume local
analysis.
16In completely different settings and concerns, Farhi and Werning (2007) show the
existence of long-run (consumption and welfare) distributions when the social discounting
(altruism) is different from the private. However, in their paper, this separation was rather
assumed on the basis of some welfare function. The existence of public debt, as the main
text shows, might help to rationalize this separation.
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steady state is stable and Sr ≤ 0.
In the stationary state, the equilibrium in financial markets is:
E(a) =
SD[w − (r − n)b]
1− SDXs ≡ (1 + n)(k + b) = S(D, r) (24)
Note from equation (24) that what matters for the supply of funds is
the fraction of mean savings assigned to finance future consumption net of
bequests (i.e. the egoistic MPS). When this feature is taken into consid-
eration, then the model resembles that of Diamond (1965). To assess the
effects of debt on capital, it is more convenient to totally differentiate the
(1 + n)(k + b) = S(D, r) equality. This equals:
dk
db
=
SD
(−)︷ ︸︸ ︷
[XS − 1] f ′ +
(−)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(SD − 1)(1 + n)
(1 + n− Srf ′′)(1− dkt+1
dkt
∣∣
db=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Q>0
)
< 0 (25)
where Q = (1+n−Srf ′′)(1− dkt+1dkt
∣∣
db=0
) > 0 is positive from the stability
condition and the numerator negative, since 0 < SD, XS < 1. Therefore,
higher public debt always crowds out capital and increases the interest rates.
Under the assumption of Sr < 0, the “income effect” dominates the “substi-
tution effect” and in equilibrium, the rise in interest rate will depress average
(mean) savings. The same occurs if Sr = 0 (i.e. when the utility is loga-
rithmic)17. The result of the fall in average wealth, indicates that debt will
crowd out capital by more than one. The implication of this statement is
that average wealth falls. Thus, the direct macroeconomic effects of a posi-
tive debt shock tends to increase wealth inequality. However, the equilibrium
effects on inequality also depend on the change in the variance. The next
section takes this issue more closely.
17See Bertola et al. (2006, Chapter 5)
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5. The Effects on Inequality
5.1. The “Mechanics” at the Macroeconomic level
To motivate the discussion on the mechanics of the model, the total
change in inequality in the stationary state is decomposed as:
dCV (V ar(a), E(a)) = W1dV ar(a) +W2(dE(a))⇒ (26)
= W1dV ar(a) +W2(1 + n)(dk + db)⇒ (27)
dCV
db
= W1︸︷︷︸
+
dV ar(a)
db︸ ︷︷ ︸
Variance effect
+W2(1 + n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
(
dk
db
+ 1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mean Effect
(28)
The formulation above reveals the “mean” and “variance” effects akin
to the one described by Bossmann et al. (2007), where W1 =
∂CV
∂V ar
and
W2 =
∂CV
∂E(a)
are the relevant contributions of each separate change in the
mean and the variance. The mean is affected by the extent of crowding
out, while the variance -as I will discuss later- by the equilibrium changes in
savings behaviour.
In equation (28), the “mean effect” is positive since debt crowds out
capital by more than one (i.e. dk
db
+ 1 < 0 ). In this instance, average
wealth falls and therefore inequality tends to increase for unchanged variance.
Nevertheless, individual savings responses will also affect the variance, due
to the perturbation in factor prices. When for example, the variance drops,
inequality tends to decrease. These two effects might compete with each
other with an ambiguous total effect.
In our context, the debt shock will trigger factor price changes through
the standard “OLG-Diamond model” mechanism. In short, when the av-
erage savings net of government bonds falls, the equilibrium interest rates
will increase. In return, the change in factor prices will determine savings
behaviour and thus the effect on the variance. The perturbation on the vari-
ance is crucially appended on factor price changes. In fact, it is the silent
features of those general equilibrium effects that could possibly reverse the
effects on wealth inequality. If those are not in operation, any conclusions
will be overturned.
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To gain some further insights for the mechanics at the macro level, I
totally differentiate ˆCV P ≡ (CV P )2
σ2
in the case of the “Progressive Tax”
economy, and ˆCV F ≡ (CV F )2
σ2
for the “Flat” tax economy18. For the latter
economy, equation (19) can be restated in a functional form as ˆCV F =
ΦF (C3, C4, C5), where C3 = SDw, C4 = SDXS, C5 = SD(r − n)b and ΦF =
C23
(1+C4)(C3−C5) . By total differentiation, someone gets:
dCˆV
F
= ΦF3︸︷︷︸
+
dC3 + Φ
F
4︸︷︷︸
−
dC4 + Φ
F
5︸︷︷︸
+
dC5 (29)
or equivalently,
dCˆV
F
db
=
[
ΦF3︸︷︷︸
+
[w∆− SDk]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+ ΦF4︸︷︷︸
−
Γ︸︷︷︸
?
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Average change
in Life-Cycle considerations
dr
db
+ ΦF5︸︷︷︸
+
+︷ ︸︸ ︷[
E︸︷︷︸
+
b
dr
db
+ ΦP5︸︷︷︸
−
SD(r − n)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Average effect
of Taxation
(30)
where the phi′s are ΦFj ≡ ∂
ˆCV F
∂Cj
for j=[3,4,5], and Γ, ∆ and E are terms
defined in Appendix B. In Table 1 below we can see the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions to sign those. In the case of a logarithmic utility, the Γ and
E terms are always positive and ∆ = 0 (See Appendix B for the proofs).
For any other utility function, I will assume that Γ < 0 and E > 0. In
other words, I implicitly assume that the level of debt is not “too high” and
consumers have plausible marginal propensities to save 19.
From equation (29), the total change in wealth inequality is attributed to
three main factors. First, it depends on how much more or less individuals
will save out of their new wage (the dC3 term). As soon as the level of debt
is not too high, to avoid any “immiseration” from very low wages, the “rich”
can save more than the “poor” and therefore inequality tends to increase (the
ΦF3 > 0 term). Second, a change in debt will affect the fraction of “parent’s”
18For the “Affine” tax economy, the equivalent expression is (CV
A)2
((1−τA)σ)2 . Since the quali-
tative effects are the same up to some constants, I will reserve the discussion for the “Flat
tax” case only.
19See for example Jappelli and Pistaferri (2012) and the literature therein.
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Conditions
(+) SD > 0.5
Γ
(-) SD < 0.5
(+) DI or SD ≥ 0.5 or S∗D < SD < 0.5
E
(-) SD < S
∗
D < 0.5
DI=Dynamic Inefficiency. The special cases are: SD =
1
2
⇒ Γ = 0,
b = w
2(r−n) ⇒ Φ
F
3 = 0 and SD = S
∗ < 0.5 ⇒ E = 0. S∗D is a
particular threshold which equals to S∗ = 1
2
− 1
2
1+n
f′ and is assumed
to be positive. In the case of logarithmic utility Γ, E > 0 always
Table 1: Main Conditions
savings that are “bequeathed” on top of “children’s wealth (the dC4 term).
On average, leaving positive bequests tends to have an equalizing effect (the
ΦF4 term). Finally, a permanent increase in government borrowing will result
to higher taxation (the dC3 term), but as soon as taxes are of “regressive”
nature they will tend to amplify the inequality levels (the ΦF5 term).
In general, the effects on inequality are ambiguous. In particular, the
source of ambiguity stems from the competing effects of the life-cycle and
bequest motives (the ΦF3 [w∆ − SDk] + ΦF4 Γ terms). Since these motives
cannot be isolated at the individual level, as a result they also appear at the
macro level. In the subsequent sections, where the individual behaviour is
analysed, the “rich” and the “poor” will have opposite qualitative responses
on these two saving scopes.
Similarly, equation (18) can be restated as ˆCV P = ΦP (C3, C4, C5) and by
total differentiation the total change is:
dCˆV
F
= ΦP3︸︷︷︸
+
dC3 + Φ
P
4︸︷︷︸
−
dC4 + Φ
P
5︸︷︷︸
−
dC5 (31)
or equivalently,
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dCˆV
P
db
=
[
ΦP3︸︷︷︸
+
[w∆− SDk]︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+ ΦP4︸︷︷︸
−
Γ︸︷︷︸
?
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Average change
in Life-Cycle considerations
dr
db
+ ΦP5︸︷︷︸
−
+︷ ︸︸ ︷[
E︸︷︷︸
+
b
dr
db
+ ΦP5︸︷︷︸
−
SD(r − n)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Average effect
of Taxation
(32)
where the phi′s are ΦPj ≡ ∂
ˆCV P
∂Cj
for j=[3,4,5]. The analysis is similar
to the one before. The only caveat is that while wages before-tax have an
unequalising effect (the ΦP3 term), the “progressivism” of the tax system
tends to offset it (the ΦP5 term).
Example: Consider the case of the proportional tax system. If prefer-
ences are logarithmic (Γ > 0, ∆ = 0), it follows from equation (32) that
higher public debt will decrease inequality. In the case of a flat tax system,
this is only true if the economy is dynamic inefficient. If not, it requires the
average change in life-cycle consideration to dominate the “wealth effects”
from taxation.
Notice also that under a “partial equilibrium analysis” (captured in Φj5SD(r−
n) terms for j=[P,F] ), the effects on inequality will follow what the tax in-
strument is supposed to do by design. However, the general equilibrium
“feedback”, due to price changes, might overturn this and in fact the effect
on wealth inequality can go in either direction. It is proper therefore, not
only to understand what will be observed at macro-level, but also what will
trigger at micro-level a debt shock.
5.2. The “Mechanics” at the individual level
The change in the variance, while it seems of quantitative nature, we can
still filter out some interesting qualitative properties. In general, to calcu-
late the variance of wealth, it is sufficient to know the asset position of each
individual. In our simple model, in order to understand the change in the
variance, we should know the equilibrium savings responses. In this context,
where altruism is taken into account, individuals will program their savings
responses on the basis of their “egoistic needs” and their “altruistic liabili-
ties”. These two scopes can further decompose the change in wealth (and
thus in the variance) into the “egoistic” and “altruistic” part respectively.
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To begin the exposition, I will first consider a “Flat” tax system. In
the stationary state xit+1 = x
i
t = x
i (and at the macro-level kt+1 = kt = k)
substituting (7) in (6) and using (10) in Di = wtl
i − τF + xi, individual
savings are equal to:
aFi =
SD
1− SDXSwl
i − SD
1− SDXS (r − n)b⇒ (33)
aFi = E(a) +
SD
1− SDXSw(l
i − 1)⇒ (34)
Equation (34) confirms that better endowed individuals are wealthier.
Taxes in this case are only implicit to the individual decision making and
what in effect matters is the fraction of wages someone can save for his own
consumption; the SD
1−SDXSw(l
i−1) term20. In fact, this term will determine the
change in the variance. To see this, restate the egoistic MPS times the wage
in functional form as Ψ(C3, C4) =
C3
1−C4 , where C3 = SDw and C4 = SDXS
as defined before. From equation (34), the total change in individual wealth
becomes:
dai = dE(ai) +
 Ψ3︸︷︷︸
+
dC3 + Ψ4︸︷︷︸
+
dC4
 (li − 1)⇒ (35)
or equivalently,
dai
db
= (1 + n)(
dk
db
+ 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ dE(a)
db
+
 Ψ3︸︷︷︸+ (w∆− SDk︸ ︷︷ ︸− )(l
i − 1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
N1
+ Ψ4︸︷︷︸
+
Γ︸︷︷︸
−
(li − 1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
N2

dr
db︸︷︷︸
+
(36)
20Note, the model can also be interpreted as one where individuals differ in their MPS,
i.e. the SDl
i term, but the distribution of li is such that the average MPS is SD. For
example, this is rationalized if agents differ in their discount factors and therefore the
more impatient individuals end up having more wealth. In fact, the spirit of the model
might be closer to this interpretation, however the convention in the literature considers
the interpretation given in the main text as more appropriate.
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where C3, C4, ∆ < 0 and Γ are terms discussed before and Ψi =
∂Ψ(C3,C4)
∂Ci
for i = [3, 4]. In the most plausible case where the MPS is SD < 0.5, it implies
Γ < 0 (See also Table 1). From equation (35), the perturbation in individual
wealth is decomposed into two parts; an aggregate (which essentially comes
from the change in factor prices) and an idiosyncratic one (which essentially
comes from the different endowments). On the one hand, a debt shock will
affect everyone equally (the d(E(a))
db
term). On the other hand, individuals
will adjust their savings (an intertemporal choice) and in parallel decide how
much to bequeath from their investments (an inratemporal choice). In other
words, consumers will save a different fraction of their new wage (the dC3
term), and at the same time will alter the fraction gone to bequests (the
dC4 term). By looking at equation (36), the “rich” consumers will save and
bequeath less (the N1 < 0 and N2 < 0 terms respectively) and the “poor”
more. Thus, when a debt shock occurs, the “idiosyncratic” and “aggregate”
components operate in the same direction for the “rich” but not for the
“poor”. In consequence, the wealth of the “rich” would fall but remain
qualitatively uncertain for the other group.
Put simply, a rise in interest rates will induce the usual income and sub-
stitution effects. Nevertheless, those should be considered in terms of future
expenditures (that is, future consumption and the bequest transfer). At the
same time, the change in interest rate will affect the intratemporal choice.
On the one hand, more bequests can be transferred due to the increase in
XS, whereas on the other hand, less can be bequeathed due to the effect
in SD. For people with different endowments, the intratemporal choice is
not the same. Thus, the savings behaviour of the “rich” is aligned with the
macroeconomic effect and their wealth falls. In this case, the extended to al-
truism “income effect” dominates the “substitution effect” and will reinforce
the “wealth effect”. For the “poor”, the idiosyncratic component competes
with the aggregate one, hence their equilibrium response is ambiguous.
However, if the utility is logarithmic (∆ = 0 and Γ > 0), this implies that
the change in savings will be ambiguous for either groups. In this case, the
“rich” will now want to bequeath more and save less, whereas the “poor” will
want to do the opposite. Nonetheless, as I show in Section 6, the relatively
“rich” will still dis-save, which implies that the “egoistic” component (the
N1 term) will dominate the altruistic one ( the N2 term). Possibly, this is
because future consumption is valued more. In this case though, the fraction
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of own investments that go to bequests will (unambiguously) increase on
average (dC4 ↑). This average increase, in turn, boils down to the special
case analysed by Bossmann et al. (2007), where higher bequests induce the
aforementioned “mean” and ”variance” effects on the macroeconomic level.
For the “Affine tax”, the analysis is analogous. To see this, note that the
stationary individual wealth can be written as:
aAi = a
F
i − τA
[
SD
1− SDXSw(l
i − 1)
]
(37)
daAi
db
=
daFi
db
− τA
[
SD
1−SDXSw(l
i − 1)
]
db
(38)
Therefore, up to some constant determined by the marginal tax rate, the
qualitative pattern remains identical21.
For the “progressive” tax regime using equation (11), the disposable in-
come is Di = (1 − τ p)wli + xi. As in the earlier procedure, the individual
wealth equals:
aPi =
(
SD(w − (r − n)b)
1− SDXS
)
li = E(a)li ⇒ (39)
aPi − E(a) = E(a)(li − 1) (40)
And the effect of debt on individual wealth is:
dai
db
=
dE(a)
db
li =
[
(1 + n)(
dk
db
+ 1)
]
li (41)
From equation (39), each individual holds a fraction of total wealth which
is in proportion of his endowment. In consequence, the effect of debt on
21If instead the free parameter for the “Affine tax” economy was TA, stationery indi-
vidual wealth would alter to aAi = a
P
i −
(
Sd
1−SDXS
)
TA. The total change in savings would
be
daAi
db =
aPi
db − T
A
1−SDXS
[
∆ + ( SD1−SDXS )Γ
]
dr
db . As soon as 0 < T
A < 1, the qualitative
pattern is similar to the one shown in Section 6 for the proportional tax.
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individual savings will also be in the same proportion (See equation (41)).
From the previous analysis, we know that higher public debt will decrease
average wealth. Therefore, equation (41) also implies a negative impact on
individual wealth. In particular, the effect will be stronger for the relatively
“rich” and milder for the relatively “poor”. However, the change in variance
is still ambiguous, but of quantitative nature, since all agents are dis-saving.
Nonetheless, some hidden qualitative differences still exist.
As earlier, any change in the dispersion of asset holdings can be decom-
posed into the part coming from own savings and the part stemming from
the altruism of parents. This decomposition is interesting on its own. For the
“Flat” or “Affine” tax economy, the behavioural elements of those were clear.
But even in this case, a similar decomposition is still possible. By adding
and subtracting the relevant terms, the asset holdings in the “proportional”
economy can be written in terms of the flat tax economy as:
aPi = a
F
i −
C5
1− C4 (l
i − 1) (42)
where C5 = SD(r − n)b and C4 = SDXS. As expected, equation (42)
confirms that the “rich” own less assets whereas the “poor” more, relative
to a regressive tax system. Defining ΨP = C5
1−C4 , using equation (36) and
collecting terms, the effect of debt on asset holdings becomes:
daPi
db
= dE(a
i)
db︸ ︷︷ ︸
−
+
[
Ψ3︸︷︷︸
+
(w∆− SDk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
−︸ ︷︷ ︸
NP1
+ Ψ4︸︷︷︸
+
Γ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
NP2
]
dr
db︸︷︷︸
+
(li − 1)− ΨP5︸︷︷︸
+
[
Eb
dr
db
+ SD(r − n)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
NP3 >0
(li − 1)
(43)
where Ψ4 = Ψ4 − ΨP4 = E(ai), and ΨPi = ∂Ψ
P
∂Ci
for i=[4,5]. The NP3
term is positive because of the change in taxes22. Equation (43) is a sim-
ple reformulation of (41), so all individual will have to dis-save in the end.
Nonetheless, the different behavioural motives, as in the “Flat” tax econ-
omy, are still present ( the second term in (43), with the NP3,4 replacing the
N1,2 terms). However, the “progressivism” of the tax system modifies the
22I assume that this is also true even in the dynamic inefficient case. Under a particular
bound on debt, this is always the case.
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personal “wealth effects” ( the third term in (43)) and thus the incentive to
save or dis-save. For instance, the “rich” expecting to bear higher taxes have
an incentive to save more, while the “poor” less. In summary, heterogeneity
itself becomes sufficient to generate different qualitative behaviour (in the
presence of a debt shock) by interacting with the altruism of individuals.
The tax instrument then, will only determine the nature of the change in
inequality (i.e. whether this will be of quantitative or qualitative nature due
to different savings behaviour).
6. Calibration and Main Results
As already mentioned in the text, the analysis is restricted to the sta-
tionary state, where Sr ≤ 0. In this model debt is exogenous, therefore it
will characterize the values of capital and the interest rates. The main con-
cern for the numerical exercises is to satisfy the stability conditions and the
stationarity for wealth accumulation (See equation (22)).
The results below rely on equation (25) to assess the effect of debt on
capital, on equations (30) and (32) to assess the effects on wealth inequal-
ity, and on equations (41), (36) and (38) to assess the individual savings
behaviour. To figure out the effects on the mean and the variance, I evaluate
the (1 + n)(dk
db
+ 1), dV ar
P
db
, dV ar
F
db
and dV ar
A
db
derivatives.
I also assume a CEIS (“CRRA”) utility function of the form: V =
c1−θt −1
1−θ + β
(
c1−θt+1−1
1−θ
)
+ δ
(
x1−θt+1−1
1−θ
)
, where the choices for the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution θ are 1.5 and θ = 1 (i.e. logarith-
mic utility). The production function in its intensive form is assumed to be
Cobb-Douglas, y = Akγ, with A = 9.37, γ = 0.3. Population growth, n,
is set to 1.81 to match the average post war growth rate in the US. The
choices for the discount factor, β and the degree of altruism δ, are set to 0.3
and 0.10 respectively, when the value for debt is 0.05. This is the case of a
dynamic efficient economy where it ensures that all conditions of the model
are satisfied. Similarly, I set β = 0.4 and δ = 0.15 with b = 0.11 for the
dynamic inefficient case. The values for the discount factor are motivated by
the RBC literature. There, β = 0.99 and each period represents a quarter. In
my calibration, this is similar to consider the time period as 30 years in the
first case and around 25 years in the second one. The choice for the degree
of altruism is essentially arbitrary but closely follows that of Bossmann et al.
(2007). In all cases, the MPS is restricted to be less than half. Finally, the
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choice for the marginal tax rate in the “Affine” tax economy is taken from
Bhandari et al. (2013) and set to τA = 0.2.
In Table 2 we can see the results obtained for our economy. At the
macroeconomic level and in all cases, the mean and variance fall. This tends
to move the inequality to opposite direction. Nevertheless, the “variance
effect” dominates the “mean effect” and inequality is suppressed. But, the
individual mechanics (between the tax systems) are different.
Dynamic Efficiency Dynamic Inefficiency
Endowment Flat Affine Prop. Flat Affine Prop.
0.2 3.20 2.14 -0.42 2.97 2.01 -0.37
0.3 2.54 1.61 -0.63 2.37 1.53 -0.55
0.4 1.88 1.08 -0.84 1.77 1.05 -0.73
0.7 -0.11 -0.51 -1.47 -0.03 -0.39 -1.28
1 -2.10 -2.10 -2.10 -1.83 -1.83 -1.83
2 -8.73 -7.40 -4.20 -7.84 -6.64 -3.67
5 -28.62 -23.32 -10.50 -25.87 -21.06 -9.17
10 -61.77 -49.84 -21.00 -55.92 -45.10 -18.35
Mean effect (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
Change in Variance (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Inequality (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Mean effect = W2(1+n)(
dk
db +1), with W2 < 0, Variance effect = W1
dV ar(ai)
db , with W1 > 0.
Each column describes the savings response for the different taxes.
Table 2: Main Results
In the “progressive” tax regime, everyone’s wealth falls proportionally,
as discussed in Section 5.2. However, in the rest of the cases, there is a
clear qualitative difference between different groups of people. In fact, the
“poorer” someone is the more is willing to save. Thus, the “poor” in this
context seem to behave as “Ricardians”23. The intuition for the behaviour
of the poor is the following: The “poorest” individuals (who had already
23See Laitner and Ohlsson (2001) for a clear exposition on the failure (at least on
average) of the Ricardian equivalence under a “joy-of-giving” bequest motive. Moreover,
the positive association between debt and the savings behaviour of the “poor” was also
present in Heathcote (2005) .
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low wages prior to the shock) would see their real wage to further decline
and their tax liability (regressive in nature) to increase. Unless they start
saving more, by exploiting the rise in the rate of interest, they will not be
in a position to finance their future consumption net of bequests. In other
words, the (extended to altruism) substitution effect is sufficiently strong to
dominate both the income and the wealth effects. This is not the case for the
“rich”, where the income effect always dominates. In “Affine” tax system, as
soon as the choice for the tax adjustment is on the common tax component,
individual behaviour will follow that of a flat tax economy. However, since not
everyone will pay the exact equal amounts in taxes, the quantitative response
will be different. The same analysis goes through for the dynamic inefficient
economies. Nevertheless, in this case and in contrast to the previous one, the
“equity-efficiency” trade-off breaks down, which extends Diamond’s original
contribution.
In Table 3, we see the results obtained for the logarithmic utility. As
someone can observe, the qualitative pattern is similar to the one described
above and follows the discussion in Section 5.2
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Dynamic Efficiency Dynamic Inefficiency
Endowment Flat Affine Prop. Flat Affine Prop.
0.2 3.62 2.57 -0.33 2.40 1.77 -0.15
0.3 2.96 2.04 -0.49 2.00 1.45 -0.23
0.4 2.30 1.51 -0.65 1.61 1.14 -0.30
0.7 0.33 -0.06 -1.15 0.43 0.19 -0.53
0.8 -0.32 -0.59 -1.31 0.03 -0.13 -0.61
0.9 -0.98 -1.11 -1.47 -0.36 -0.44 -0.68
1 -1.64 -1.64 -1.64 -0.76 -0.76 -0.76
2 -8.20 -6.89 -3.27 -4.71 -3.92 -1.52
5 -27.90 -22.64 -8.18 -16.55 -13.39 -3.79
10 -60.72 -48.90 -16.36 -36.28 -29.18 -7.59
Mean effect (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
Change in Variance (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Inequality (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-)
Mean effect = W2(1+n)(
dk
db +1), with W2 < 0, Variance effect = W1
dV ar(ai)
db , with W1 > 0.
Each column describes the saving response for the different taxes.
Table 3: Logarithmic Utility
7. Conclusions
This paper offers a simple illustration on how debt policies affect wealth
inequality when a reduced form of altruism is taken into account. In partic-
ular, I show a case where agents have different qualitative saving responses
based on the sole features of heterogeneity in endowments and a “joy-of-
giving” bequest motive. The different savings behaviour emanates from the
life-cycle motives and more specifically from the different altruistic attitude
between households. Consequently, it might be more prudent for the effects
of debt on inequalities to be analysed within a framework where altruism is
explicitly modelled.
Nevertheless, the findings here are in accord with Floden (2001) where
the same negative long-run relationship between government debt and wealth
inequality is also present. This might suggest that the role of heterogeneous
endowments might be more important than the incompleteness of the fi-
nancial markets for the effects of debt on asset accumulation, and hence on
wealth inequality.
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To highlight the last point, this paper documents the ambiguous savings
behaviour of the “poor” (See also footnote 23 ). This feature, implies that
the choice of the tax instrument influences solely the nature of the change
in inequality. For instance, when the savings behaviour among individuals
differs qualitatively (which occurs when taxes are regressive), public debt
behaves as a redistributive device within the population. Debt adjustments,
in this case, might not only clash with demands to reduce inequality but also
redistribute wealth from some fraction of the population to the other. In our
example, the redistribution of debt adjustments will occur from the “poor”
to the “rich”24.
Finally, the negative correlation between public debt and wealth inequal-
ity, seems to be also supported by some preliminary empirical work in the
literature. More specifically, some evidence on the effects of pro-cyclical fis-
cal policies (i.e. proxy to an exogenous debt shock) on income inequality
is provided by Vegh and Vuletin (2014). Their findings indicate that pro-
cyclical fiscal policies tend to exacerbate income inequality (a measure which
is highly correlated with wealth inequality (OECD (2009)). Thus, the theo-
retical results here seems to have some validity in practise. However, those
should only interpreted as indicative and certainly more work is needed in
this direction.
To conclude, the results of the effects of debt on wealth inequality rely
crucially on the general equilibrium effects, that is the indirect effects on the
variance due to the change in the interest rate. Recent research by Laubach
(2009) seems to confirm that budget deficits do affect the rate of interest.
However, as I analysed in the main text, the scale of crowding out on capital
also matters. In this respect, the assumption of a closed economy might be
important.
24More generally, it is very easy then to note that the shape of distribution might matter
as agents can be distinguished by their types, that is their endowments.
27
A. Proofs
A.1. Proof for ∆ < 0
Proof From dC3 = SDdw + wdSD. Noting that SD is a function of the
interest rate and the MPB, then dSD = SDrdr + SDxdXS. Since XS is a
function of the interest rate, we also have dXS = XSrdr. Therefore, dSD =
SDrdr+SDxXSrdr. Define, ∆ = SDr +SDxXSr, substituting the expressions
for all terms and using the fact that (1 + n)XSr = Xs, someone gets ∆ =
2SDx
1+n
[Xs−1] < 0 which is unambiguously negative. If the utility is logarithmic
then dSD = 0 ⇒ ∆ = 0. For the definitions of SDr, SDx and XSr see
Appendix B. For further details see On-line Appendix .
A.2. The conditions on Γ
Proof From dC4 = XSdSD + SDdXs, using dSD = SDrdr + SDxdXS, then
dC4 = [XS∆ + SDXSr]dr. Define Γ = XS∆ + SDXSr. Using, XSr =
Xs
1+n
and the definition for Xs, we have Γ = XS
[
∆ + SD
f ′
]
. So, if the utility
is logarithmic ∆ = 0 ⇒ Γ > 0. Otherwise, Γ can be of either sign. In
particular, Γ > 0 iff :
∆ +
SD
f ′
> 0
Using the definition for ∆ =
2SDx
1 + n
[Xs − 1]
SD >
2SDx
1 + n
[1−Xs]f ′
1 > 2SDZ1
Where in the last steps I used SDx = (SD)
2β U
′′(Ct+1)
U ′′(Ct) (1 + n)f
′ and SD =
1
Z1+1
with Z1 = β
U ′′(ct+1)
U ′′(Ct)
[1 − Xs](f ′)2. Therefore, using SD = 1Z1+1 , 1 >
2SDZ1 ⇒ SD > 12 . The conditions in the main text follow .
A.3. The conditions on E
Proof From dC5 = SDd(r−n)b+(r−n)bdSD and using ∆ = − 2f ′SD(1−SD),
dC5 = SDd(r − n)b + [(SDf ′ + ∆)f ′ − (1 + n)∆]bdr. Define E = (SDf ′ +
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∆)f ′ − (1 + n)∆ = SD + (r− n)∆. So, if the economy is dynamic inefficient
this is always positive. Otherwise, some conditions must be put. With
some algebra E is also equals to E = 2SD[SD − 12 + 1+nf ′ (1 − SD)]. Define,
P = SD − 12 + 1+nf ′ (1 − SD), thus if SD > 12 then P > 0 ⇒ E > 0. Hence
more investigation is required for a dynamic efficient economy and SD <
1
2
.
Consider the case SD <
1
2
and f ′ > 1 + n. Then, P < 0 iff, SD < 1− 0.51− 1+n
f ′
.
Thus, if the MPS is less than SD < 1 − 0.51− 1+n
f ′
< 0.5 then P < 0 ⇒ E < 0,
otherwise, if 1− 0.5
1− 1+n
f ′
< SD <
1
2
⇒ P > 0⇒ E > 0 .
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B. Definitions and Notations
S(r,D) = saving function
X(r,S) = bequests function
SD =
∂S(r,D)
∂D
< 1
=
1
Z1 + 1
with Z1 = β(1 + rt+1)
2U
′′(ct+1)
U ′′(ct)
(1−Xs)
Sr =
∂S(r,D)
∂r
< 1
XS =
∂X(r,S)
∂s
XS ≡ (1 + n)Xs
f ′
< 1
SDr =
∂SD
∂r
< 0
= −(SD)2
[
β
U ′′(ct+1)
U ′′(ct)
(2−Xs)(1 + rt+1)
]
SDx =
∂SD
∂XS
> 0
= (SD)
2
[
β
U ′′(ct+1)
U ′′(ct)
(1 + n)(1 + rt+1)
]
XSr =
∂XS
∂r
> 0
=
Xs
1 + n
∆ = SDr + SDxXSr =
=
2SDx
1 + n
[Xs − 1] < 0
= − 2
f ′
SD(1− SD) < 0
E = SD + (r − n)∆
Γ = Xs[∆ +
SD
f ′
]
C3 = SDw
C4 = SDXS
C5 = SD(r − n)b
ΦF3 = CˆV
F
[
2
C3
− 1
C3 − C5
]
> 0
iff b <
w
2(r − n) or r < n
ΦF4 = −CˆV
F
(
1
1 + C4
) < 0
ΦF5 = −CˆV
F
(
1
C3 − C5 ) > 0
ΦP3 =
1
1 + C4
> 0
ΦP4 = −
C3 − C5
1 + C4
(
1
1 + C4
) < 0
ΦP5 = −ΦP3 < 0
dC3 = [w∆− SDk]dr
dC4 = Γdr
dC5 = SD(r − n)db+ Ebdr
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